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The Limitations of Hierarchical
Organization*
Angela Potochnik and Brian McGill†‡
The concept of levels of organization is prominent in science and central to a variety
of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of universal
and discrete hierarchical levels, and these undermine implications commonly ascribed
to hierarchical organization. We suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative.
Investigating causal processes at different scales allows for a notion of quasi levels that
avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of levels. Our primary focus is
ecology, but we suggest how the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy
in science and philosophy of science.
1. Classic Levels of Organization. The concept of hierarchical organi-
zation is commonplace in science and philosophical treatments of science.
Though there are different applications of the concept of hierarchy, our
primary focus here is the idea that material composition is hierarchical.
Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells com-
pose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; inter-
breeding organisms compose populations, which compose communities,
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Figure 1. One of the first figures in most ecology textbooks depicts hierarchical
levels of organization and asserts their relevance for the study of biology, and
especially ecology. Source: Sadava et al. (2008, fig. 1.6).
which compose ecosystems; and so on. The basic idea is that higher-level
entities are composed of (and only of) lower-level entities, but the prev-
alent concept of hierarchical organization involves stronger claims as well.
The compositional hierarchy is often taken to involve stratification into
discrete and universal levels of organization. It is also often assumed that
levels are nested, that is, that an entity at any level is composed of ag-
gregated entities at the next lower level. Intuitively, a population is simply
an assemblage of organisms that bear a particular relationship to one
another, just as a molecule is simply an assemblage of atoms that bear a
(distinct) particular relationship to one another.
This conception of hierarchy is represented in figure 1, which is a re-
production of one of the first figures appearing in a popular undergraduate
ecology textbook (Sadava et al. 2008). Indeed, talk of levels is particularly
prominent in the field of ecology: nearly all textbooks use the idea that
ecological organization is hierarchical as an organizing principle. In ad-
dition to Sadava et al.’s book, Ricklefs’s The Economy of Nature (2008),
possibly the most popular undergraduate ecology textbook, has an in-
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troductory chapter with a description and visual representation of the
levels of organization, then has book sections in order of Life and the
Physical Environment (basically physiological ecology) followed by In-
dividuals, Populations, Species Interactions, Communities, and finally
Ecosystems. Another popular text by Molles (2002) has a nearly identical
organization. A third popular ecology text even alludes to hierarchical
organization in its title: Ecology: Individuals, Populations, and Commu-
nities (Begon, Harper, and Townsend 1986). Editions of these textbooks
have been around for decades and have been used to train most practicing
ecologists today. (Indeed, the second author learned his introductory ecol-
ogy from the third book over 25 years ago.) The ecologists writing these
textbooks were themselves trained to focus on hierarchical organization.
Odum’s (1959) ecology textbook describes transitions from “protoplasm
to cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, organisms, populations, com-
munities, ecosystems and biosphere” (6).
The concept of hierarchical levels of organization is not merely used
to promote basic ecological understanding in students and nonexperts.
Hierarchy is a key organizing principle for the field of ecology, particularly
since O’Neill et al.’s (1986) influential book conceptualized all of ecology
in terms of hierarchy. According to Lidicker (2008, 72), “the nested levels
of organization hierarchy has been widely adopted by biologists.” The
idea of levels of organization is of similar prominence in philosophy of
science, and there are striking parallels in how the concept is treated in
the two disciplines. For instance, in virtue of the assumption that levels
are nested, the ecological hierarchy is sometimes referred to as “the pyr-
amid of life” (Lidicker 2008). This is the apex of the pyramid often used
to represent the classic reductionist conception of the whole of science,
which ultimately bottoms out at subatomic particles (Oppenheim and
Putnam 1958). Yet despite this prominence and analogous treatment of
hierarchical organization, there is little agreement in ecology or philosophy
about the nature and significance of levels. In this section, we outline a
variety of common claims about the nature and significance of hierarchical
organization. This prepares the way for section 2, in which we will develop
criticisms of all but the most basic conception of hierarchical composition.
Finally, in section 3, we suggest a wholesale replacement for the concept
of hierarchy that may accomplish what hierarchy cannot and is less apt
to inspire overly strong conclusions.
Feibleman (1954) outlines a classic view of levels of organization that
prefigures many later, more nuanced treatments of related issues. His
comments provide a convenient starting point for our discussion. Feible-
man claims that entities at each successive higher level of organization
possess new properties not belonging to their components, for they are
particular organizations of their lower-level parts. And yet, any high-level
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object “depends for its continuance” on its lower-level elements (66). A
living cell has the property of self-replication, whereas the molecules com-
posing it do not; but there would be no cell without molecules. Feibleman
also claims that complexity always increases as levels are ascended while
rate of change always decreases. This is related to the last of Feibleman’s
claims that we will discuss, namely, that organization at a given level is
accomplished by a mechanism at the level below, for the purpose it fills
at the level above.
Feibleman’s comments about distinctive higher-level properties and
their dependence on the lower level introduce the issue of the relationship
between higher-level and lower-level properties. The idea that higher-level
entities possess novel properties is the basis of the idea of emergence.
Emergent properties are generally taken to be high-level properties that
cannot be predicted, explained, or reduced by lower-level properties, in-
sofar as the organization of components is crucial to the properties’ emer-
gence (Kim 1999; Mitchell, forthcoming). The existence and causal rel-
evance of emergent properties are disputed. Less controversial is the idea
of mereological supervenience; even proponents of emergentism generally
grant that all properties of any (physical) system are determined by the
properties of its microphysical components (Horgan 1982; Kim 1999).
This metaphysical determination is distinct from causal determination; it
is a claim about the metaphysical dependence of higher-level properties
on lower-level properties. The idea is that there can be no change in a
higher-level property without a corresponding change in one or more
lower-level properties. This seems to follow from the compositional re-
lationship of parts to a whole, as long as the parts are all there is to the
whole (i.e., barring the possibility of special introductions at higher levels,
such as an élan vital or nonphysical soul).
Consider next Feibleman’s claims that higher levels of organization are
marked by greater complexity and slower rates of change. These ideas
have received more attention in ecology than in philosophy. Jagers op
Akkerhuis (2008) offers the following brief characterization of the idea
that complexity increases with hierarchical organization: “The organi-
zation of nature is profoundly hierarchical, because from its beginning,
interactions between simple elements have continuously created more
complex systems, that themselves served as the basis for still more complex
systems” (2). This couples the idea of nested composition with causal
production, such that higher-level entities are automatically taken to be
more causally complex than their lower-level parts.1 O’Neill et al. (1986)
rely on similar ideas to justify their idea that hierarchies can be distin-
1. This may in part motivate the widespread idea that biological complexity has in-
creased through evolutionary history (McShea 1991).
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guished by their different rates of change. They claim that higher levels
will change more slowly than lower levels (76). Their reasoning seems to
be that lower-level interactions amass to result in higher-level behaviors,
so the latter must be slower than the former. Though they acknowledge
difficulties with the classic view of levels of organization, O’Neill et al.
do not clearly distinguish their conception of hierarchical organization
from the classic view, and their main examples are also commonly taken
to be examples of nested compositional hierarchies. O’Neill et al. further
claim that “any attempt to relate a macroscopic property to the detailed
behaviors of components several layers lower in the hierarchy is bound
to fail due to the successive filtering” (80–81). Detailed arguments for this
are developed by O’Neill (1979), and the inability is labeled the “trans-
mutation problem.” This is akin to antireductionism about properties,
but it instead seems to predict the inability to track causal propagation
across levels.
The last of Feibleman’s claims that resonates in a useful way with more
recent discussions of levels is the idea that the organization of an entity
at a given level is accomplished by a mechanism at the level below and
that the purpose of that entity’s organization is established at the next
level above. Some philosophers take mechanisms to be crucial to making
sense of the causal significance of levels. Machamer, Darden, and Craver
(2000) characterize mechanisms as entities or activities that produce reg-
ular changes, and they claim that mechanisms form nested hierarchies.
That is, lower-level mechanisms have dedicated roles as parts of higher-
level mechanisms. Craver and Bechtel (2007) argue that mechanisms are
key to making sense of all interlevel causal claims. They suggest that
causal relationships occur only within a single level, so claims of a causal
relationship between entities at different levels actually should be under-
stood as partly a causal claim and partly a constitutive claim. Like O’Neill
et al. (1986), these authors articulate a specific basis for hierarchical or-
ganization that is distinct from simple composition. However, they suggest
that their favored characterization is in fact a version of the traditional
compositional hierarchy.2
Another type of significance that has been attributed to levels of or-
ganization regards scientific explanation. According to explanatory re-
ductionists, higher-level events and regularities should be explained by
demonstrating how they arise from lower-level events and regularities
2. According to Craver and Bechtel (2007, 550), “levels of mechanisms are a species
of compositional, or part-whole, relations.” They cite as evidence some of the very
features discussed in this section: that levels of mechanisms are ordered by size, with
lower-level entities smaller than higher-level entities, and that levels of mechanisms
have slower actions and greater complexity at higher levels.
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(Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Nagel 1961; Hempel 1966). This thesis is
justified with an appeal to the metaphysical dependence of higher-level
entities on lower-level entities, that is, mereological supervenience. If all
phenomena are determined by entities, causal relationships, and laws at
a lower level, then perhaps uncovering lower-level truths—and their re-
lationship to higher levels—is key to explaining higher-level phenomena.
Many ecologists look for ecological explanations at lower levels of or-
ganization, whether in population dynamics (MacArthur 1968; Wilson
and Bossert 1971; May 1976), physiological and behavioral processes
(Schoener 1986), or even chemical and physical principles (West and
Brown 2005). Arguments against explanatory reductionism also often rely
on hierarchical organization, but to opposite effect. They appeal to emer-
gent properties at higher levels, namely, properties that do not reduce to
lower-level properties (Mitchell, forthcoming), or to multiply realizable
properties, namely, properties that supervene on any one of many distinct
lower-level properties (Fodor 1974; Putnam 1975; Garfinkel 1981). More
generally, Wimsatt (2007) claims that there is a “level-centered orientation
of explanations” (214).
Finally, some explicitly or implicitly consider lower-level theories to be
epistemically more secure than higher-level theories. An example is Op-
penheim and Putnam’s (1958) suggestion that all scientific investigations
ultimately may be vindicated by demonstrating their foundation in mi-
crophysical law. Such notions of the epistemic value of the lower level are
seldom explicitly distinguished from claims of the explanatory value of
the lower level. Yet even avowed antireductionists about explanations
sometimes assume that physical theory is somehow epistemically privi-
leged over theories in the biological and social sciences. We believe it is
a common assumption that if such theories conflict, the higher-level the-
ories should be rejected in favor of the lower-level theories. However,
claims to this effect are seldom defended in writing and occur more often
in casual conversation. In ecology, population (Wiens 1990) or individual
(Schoener 1986) models are clearly privileged over macroecology models.
At a seminar when the second author presented his macroecological work,
a prominent ecologist responded, “to me, if it is not based in population
processes, it is not science.”
In this section we have surveyed a range of implications attributed to
hierarchical levels of organization. This survey is not exhaustive, but it
does capture many of the prominent ideas about the significance of levels.
Those ideas can be divided into three categories. First, there are claims
about the metaphysical significance of hierarchical levels. These include
discussions of mereological supervenience and emergent properties. Sec-
ond, there are claims about the causal significance of levels. These include
ideas put forward about the relative complexity and rates of change of
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different levels as well as the conception of hierarchy in terms of levels
of mechanisms. Third, there are claims about the explanatory and evi-
dential significance of levels. These pertain to theories about different
levels rather than to entities at different levels of organization. The tra-
ditional view of a reductive unity of science falls in this category, but
other views embody it as well. For all of these claims about the significance
of hierarchical organization, some version of a universal stratification into
compositional levels is assumed.3 Yet the assumption often remains in the
background; as Kim (2002) points out, the conception of levels employed
is seldom made explicit.
2. A Vexed Concept. To summarize section 1, the classic formulation of
levels of organization in science and philosophy of science is a compo-
sitional hierarchy. Each higher-level entity is taken to be an aggregate of
entities at the next lower level, so levels are distinguished according to
the relationship of parts to a whole. This conception of hierarchical levels
is ascribed a variety of implications in various literatures in philosophy
and ecology. We have characterized several and grouped them as meta-
physical, causal, and evidential/explanatory in nature. In this section, we
develop criticisms of all but the most basic conception of the composi-
tional hierarchy. In our view, the many overly ambitious conclusions
drawn from the simple fact of part-whole composition—and the persis-
tence of those conclusions—demonstrate that hierarchical stratification is
not useful as a general conception of ecology or science.
2.1. Metaphysical Significance. Claims about hierarchical organiza-
tion often appeal to the ubiquity of part-whole composition. Indeed, the
very notion of stratified levels depends on not only the ubiquity, but also
the uniformity, of part-whole composition. For strata to emerge, atoms
must always compose molecules, populations must always compose com-
munities, and so forth. But the uniformity of composition needed for
stratified levels simply does not exist. Guttman (1976), a biologist, force-
fully made this point. (Kim [2002] makes the same point, and Wimsatt
[2007] argues that uniformity of composition fails at higher levels.) Gutt-
man provides a variety of examples demonstrating that objects at some
level n are often not composed exclusively of objects at level . Forn  1
3. Wimsatt (2007) is an exception. He endorses many of these theses about the sig-
nificance of levels of organization, but he maintains that decomposability into discrete
levels is not universal. Yet, whereas Wimsatt holds the view that “levels of organization
are a deep, non-arbitrary, and extremely important feature of the ontological archi-
tecture of the natural world” (203), our main thesis is the opposite: that the concept
of discrete ontological levels does not succeed and has been used to motivate several
problematic claims about the natural world.
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instance, ecosystems are said to be composed of populations or com-
munities, but individual molecules, such as molecules of food waste, are
also an important component. Tissues are only partly composed of cells;
also crucial are the macromolecules that hold the cells together. Polymer
molecules are composed of monomers, but individual ions are also an
important ingredient (Guttman 1976).
Care must be taken in articulating the sense in which composition is
ubiquitous. It may be that every whole is composed of smaller parts. We
do not question that claim here. But it is certainly not the case that every
whole is composed of only parts at the next lower level. Nor is it the case
that each type of whole is composed of all and only the same types of
parts. Consider organisms. Big, lumbering organisms like us are composed
of organ systems as well as, for example, cells that often act individually,
such as blood cells’ role in oxygen transport. At the other extreme, single-
celled organisms are not composed of cells at all; they are composed of
cell parts, such as organelles. There is also an array of different com-
positional configurations between these extremes as well as some entities
whose status as organisms is a matter of dispute (Wilson 2008). There is
thus reason to call into question the very notion of universal, stratified
levels.
Similar difficulties plague the idea that higher-level properties super-
vene on lower-level properties. We will not dispute the universality of
mereological supervenience, that is, the idea that every higher-level prop-
erty supervenes on lower-level properties. But similar limitations pertain
to supervenience as to composition. First of all, each type of higher-level
property need not supervene on the same types of lower-level properties.
This follows from the well-appreciated phenomenon of multiple realiza-
tion. Many higher-level properties may supervene on (i.e., be realized by)
any of a variety of lower-level properties. For instance, the organism-level
property of camouflage is realized by an array of lower-level properties.
For many animals, camouflage consists of pigmented cells that disguise
through coloration. Other instances of camouflage involve morphological
structures of the animal or materials in the environment. The properties
of cells, of larger parts of animals, and of nearby materials variously
realize organism camouflage by matching backgrounds, concealing shad-
ows, obliterating forms, disguising motion, masquerading as other objects,
or creating other perceptual effects (Stevens and Merilaita 2009). Such
multiple realization means that any number of types of lower-level prop-
erties, of any number of types of lower-level objects, may realize a given
higher-level property. Moreover, distinct realizers may very well occupy
different levels of organization (Melinda Fagan, personal correspon-
dence).
There is also no guarantee that higher-level properties will supervene
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on a well-defined set of lower-level properties (Mitchell, forthcoming).
Even in individual occurrences, higher-level properties may be realized by
a complicated combination of lower-level properties that are not naturally
grouped as an object of study. One of the authors has termed this complex
realization (Potochnik 2010b). To return to the example of camouflage,
consider what properties determine an instance of, say, a fish having the
property of being camouflaged as a fallen leaf on a stream bed. Relevant
properties of the parts of the fish include the properties that determine
its overall shape, that it is positioned on its side, and the colors and
arrangement of its pigmented cells. Properties of the environment are also
relevant: the presence of leaf litter in the stream as well as its heterogeneity,
size, and color. Finally, properties of the predators also matter for this
to achieve camouflage: predators must be diurnal and aquatic and must
hunt by sight (Sazima et al. 2006). The supervenience base of this instance
of camouflage—namely, the set of properties that metaphysically deter-
mines the presence of the camouflage property—is a complicated set of
properties belonging to fish parts, parts of the environment, and parts of
predator populations. This set of properties is not naturally ascribed to
entities at a single level of organization.
In summary, hierarchical composition may be universal in the sense
that every extant whole is composed of proper parts, and mereological
supervenience may be universal in the sense that every higher-level prop-
erty is metaphysically determined by lower-level properties. But stratifi-
cation into levels is not universal or discrete. Stratification is not discrete
in that it is not the case that an object taken to be at some level n is
composed of all and only parts at level . Stratification is not universaln  1
in that it is not the case that all objects taken to be at level n are composed
of parts from the same levels . Similar difficulties plague thej, . . . , k
metaphysical property determination of the higher level by the lower level,
for mereological supervenience is complicated by multiple realization and
complex realization. Because of multiple realization, the presence of some
high-level property provides little or no information about its determiners,
even the level(s) at which its determiners are found; the supervenience
base is highly variable from instance to instance. Because of complex
realization, the nature of the supervenience base in a given instance is
even obscure. There may be a long list of relevant lower-level properties,
and they may not all be properties belonging to entities at the same level
or even belonging to parts of the object with the higher-level property in
question. Even if universal mereological supervenience is a fact, it is not
associated with the hierarchical stratification of objects or their properties.
2.2. Explanations and Evidence. Similar difficulties also undermine the
supposed explanatory significance of hierarchical stratification. The idea
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of supervenience is at the heart of explanatory reductionism, the view
that higher-level events and regularities should be explained by showing
how they are metaphysically determined by lower-level events and reg-
ularities (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Nagel 1961; Hempel 1966). Ac-
cordingly, many philosophers have used multiple realization as a basis
for arguing against the explanatory priority of the lower level (e.g., Fodor
1974; Putnam 1975; Garfinkel 1981). For multiply realized properties,
higher-level regularities exist despite lower-level variations. Antireduc-
tionists use this as grounds to dispute the idea that understanding of
higher-level phenomena is provided by lower-level information.
The possibility of complex realization—that higher-level properties
may be realized by an obscure combination of lower-level properties, as
introduced in the section above—further undermines the significance of
stratified levels for scientific explanations. The properties that figure into
lower-level explanations often fail to be the true supervenience bases of
the properties that figure into higher-level explanations. When this is the
case, mereological supervenience loses its relevance for the comparison
of explanatory strategies. Explanatory reductionists and antireductionists
alike err in using supervenience as a way to evaluate the relative value of
explanations formulated at different levels. Explanations may be cate-
gorized as lower or higher level insofar as they refer to smaller or larger
objects—perhaps even parts or wholes. Yet this distinction loses its im-
portance without a basis for comparison (Potochnik 2010b).
The original goal of explanatory reductionism was ultimately epistemic
in nature. Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) hoped that all high-level laws
could ultimately be derived from—that is, explained by—fully general
microphysical laws. This was supposed to vindicate the high-level sciences
by showing their basis in microphysics. To Oppenheim and Putnam, the
only alternative seemed to be acknowledging nonphysical entities such as
the élan vital or nonphysical soul, a repellant proposition for any sort of
physicalist (see Potochnik 2011). Though this conception of epistemic
vindication via reduction may now be out of favor, we suspect that its
ghost lingers in a tendency to credit lower-level theories with greater
epistemic security than higher-level theories. This would account for the
tendency to assume that higher-level theories should be rejected in favor
of lower-level theories when they conflict (discussed in sec. 1). For ex-
ample, physiological models are often privileged over macroecological
models (Schoener 1986), and population genetic models are often privi-
leged over phenotypic optimization models (e.g., Curnow and Ayres 2007).
Yet we can think of no basis for privileging lower-level theories in this
way. There is no reason to expect that, in general, higher-level theories
are less well supported than lower-level theories. For instance, physio-
logical models generally do not incorporate interactions between species,
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such as competition, that are critical to producing the phenomena de-
scribed in macroecology. Similarly, Potochnik (2010a) shows how popu-
lation genetic models are not epistemically privileged over purely phe-
notypic models. For instance, in population genetics, selection coefficients
are usually calculated via empirical measure of one fitness component,
such as offspring raised to weaning, in lieu of the ecological information
that is usually available for phenotypic models.
Not only are lower-level theories often credited with greater epistemic
security, they also are seen to have a more general domain of application.
Physics is the ultimate example, for it is taken to be the only “funda-
mental” science. Kim (2002) says, as if stating a universally shared view,
that “the domain of physics includes all that there is” (16). But here one
must distinguish between physical entities and physical theory. Any phys-
icalist will grant that all objects are composed of only physical stuff. In
contrast, it is not obvious—and quite likely false—that theories in physics
address all phenomena. It would take the success of a strong reductionist
program for any future theories of physics to account for sociological
phenomena, for example.
These supposed explanatory and epistemic significances of hierarchical
organization arise from a common source, namely, assumptions regarding
universal stratified levels, and how lower-level parts and their properties
metaphysically determine higher-level objects and their properties. The
difficulties with these supposed significances also stem from a single
source. Most basically, granting the existence of part-whole composition
and mereological supervenience is not sufficient support for the idea that
theories and representations are related in these ways. Metaphysical de-
termination is a relation among properties at different levels; this does
not straightforwardly dictate the explanatory or epistemic relationship
among the theories that have been formulated about phenomena at dif-
ferent levels.
2.3. Levels of Causation. The claims about the significance of levels
for relative complexity and rates of change that we described in section
1 rely on the idea that changes at a given level are mediated by lower-
level processes. Higher-level systems are taken to be more complex since
they are created via interactions among simpler lower-level elements. It
is also supposed that changes occur more slowly at these higher levels
since they are mediated by lower-level changes. Those who defend mech-
anisms as a way of distinguishing levels articulate a version of this same
idea. The conception of nested hierarchies of mechanisms, in which lower-
level mechanisms perform roles that contribute to some higher-level mech-
anism, is a particular version of the thesis that changes at a given level
are mediated by lower-level processes or, in particular, mechanisms.
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Yet this assumption about the causal significance of levels is flawed,
at least when applied to the classic compositional hierarchy. Guttman
(1976) argues that, just as an object may have important parts at several
different levels of organization, interactions between systems at a given
level may be mediated by objects at several different levels. For instance,
consider the variety of types of interactions among organisms. One or-
ganism may causally influence another via the mediation of pheromones,
a type of molecule; may causally produce another via a gamete, a type
of cell; or may causally influence another via attack and ingestion, which
involves much or all of the organism.4 A corollary to this point is that
causal interactions are not always among systems at the same level of
organization—again, at least with regard to the classic compositional
hierarchy. Very small objects can causally influence objects taken to be
many levels higher: witness the crucial role of waste molecules in an
ecosystem. High-level objects can also causally influence objects at much
lower levels, what is sometimes termed downward causation (Campbell
1974).
For example, ecology has placed increasing emphasis on migration
from a “regional pool” as important in structuring local community dy-
namics (Hubbell 2001; Magurran and Henderson 2003; McGill 2003;
Leibold et al. 2004; Zillio and Condit 2007). In this conceptualization,
the regional pool is either an explicit assemblage of many communities
known as a metacommunity (Leibold et al. 2004) or an abstract gener-
alization of a much larger area that is structured by different processes
(Hubbell 2001; McGill 2003). Similarly, in the study of abundance (the
population size of an organism), there is increasingly a move away from
the traditional idea that abundance is determined locally through inter-
actions with competitors (MacArthur 1968) and toward the idea that
global abundance (abundance of a species across its entire range), shaped
by processes such as the evolution of specialists versus generalists, is a
crucial determiner (Gaston and Blackburn 2000; Gregory 2000; White et
al. 2007). Finally, in molecular and cellular biology, there has been a
growing disenchantment with the inability of the reductionist approach—
that is, a focus on single, isolated molecules—to explain medically im-
portant but holistic disease concepts such as “metabolic syndrome” (link-
ing heart disease, diabetes, obesity, etc.). There is now a trend toward
placing individual molecules into a systemic context known as “systems
biology” (Kitano 2002).
This undermines the idea that all changes are mediated by causal
processes solely at a lower level, thereby removing the basis of the claim
4. Throughout this discussion, we assume that there are high-level causal relationships.
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that complexity always increases as the hierarchy is ascended. And there
is indeed reason to doubt that compositional levels are always ordered
according to their causal complexity. Strevens (2006), for instance, pro-
poses an account of how simple behavior emerges in high-level systems,
even when the parts of the systems interact in complex ways. One of
Strevens’s primary examples is the relatively simple behavior of whole
ecosystems, as seen in the wide applicability of, for example, the Lotka-
Volterra equations for predator-prey cycles.
There is also no reason to conclude that rates of change always slow
as the hierarchy is ascended. Consider the sudden extinction of a large
population of organisms or even an entire ecosystem. In contrast, ge-
notypes are exceedingly conservative, and the evolution of a new gene
complex can take thousands of generations. The type of change in ques-
tion is more significant for its rate than is the size of the entities involved.
Abandoning the idea that changes are always mediated by lower-level
processes undermines the idea that mechanisms provide a way to distin-
guish among levels of organization. The parts and wholes of the classic
compositional hierarchy do not uniformly constitute nested levels of
mechanisms. It is possible to provide an alternative definition of levels in
terms of mechanisms. Craver and Bechtel (2007), for instance, explicitly
distinguish levels according to the components of mechanisms. But
whereas Craver and Bechtel suggest levels of mechanisms as a species of
the compositional hierarchy (see n. 2 above), it must instead be empha-
sized that this conception of mechanism levels does not cohere to the
classic conception of hierarchy. (Craver [2007] does more to establish that
distinction.) Furthermore, the division of levels of mechanism is variable,
depending on what causal processes—namely, what mechanisms—are fo-
cal.
3. Replacing Levels with Scale. Let us consider where we have arrived.
Though the concept of hierarchical levels of organization crops up in an
impressive array of philosophical and scientific contexts, the various sig-
nificances attributed to it almost entirely fail. The simple fact of part-
whole composition is not a sound basis for the assertion of the universal
stratification of objects and their properties into discrete levels, or the
explanatory or evidential significance of this supposed stratification. Many
of the supposed causal significances of hierarchical organization also fail
to obtain.
These failures are extensive, but still the concept of hierarchical levels
of organization persists or, more accurately, many concepts of hierarchy
persist. These include, for example, nested levels of mechanism (Ma-
chamer et al. 2000; Craver and Bechtel 2007), hierarchical rates of change
(O’Neill et al. 1986), and behavioral composition (Rueger and McGivern
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2010). Different conceptions of hierarchical organization do not obviously
align, and these raise the question of whether, or to what extent, they
cohere. As Rueger and McGivern put the point, “we might wonder
whether one hierarchy or ordering is genuine and the others merely con-
venient, or indeed whether all hierarchies have no ontological significance
and are merely different modes of representing an un-layered reality”
(380). We suggest the latter. The search for a universal hierarchical or-
dering with any broad significance is futile and should be replaced by an
approach that explicitly limits its aims to useful quasi-hierarchical rep-
resentations.5
There are significant reasons to abandon the concept of a single, on-
tologically significant system of hierarchical organization. It has histori-
cally been associated with an astounding range of implications, few or
none of which are borne out, as demonstrated in section 2. The very
formulation of the concept suggests universality and, thereby, ontological
significance, both of which we have called into doubt. We therefore suggest
abandoning the terminology, and the concept, of hierarchical levels of
organization. We suggest that the concept of scale take its place as an
organizing scheme for ecology, and perhaps in science more broadly.
3.1. Ecological Scale. Our suggested replacement for the concept of
hierarchy stems from current ecology. By some measures, the most heavily
cited paper in ecology today is Levin (1992) on the role of scale in ecology.
Levin asserts that “the problem of relating phenomena across scales is
the central problem in biology and in all of science” (1961; see also Wiens
1989; Schwartz 2002). Scale is the spatial or temporal extent across which
observations span. That is, it is the size of the “ruler” used to measure a
system, the choice of which influences the type of observations made.
Ecology is sometimes studied at the scale of square meter plots of grass;
other ecological studies span entire continents or the globe (a scale of
1,000–10,000 kilometers to a side, or 1012–1014 square meters). Temporal
scales and the spatial scales often covary—processes occurring at large
spatial scales often also occur on long timescales—but there are excep-
tions.6
This recent focus on scale is a response to a trend in ecology during
5. Our argument does not prohibit hierarchical representations that have an explicit
basis for ranking and are limited in scope and domain of application. However, any
concept constrained in these ways is not well positioned to stand in for classical levels
of organization.
6. Note that the term “large scale” can have opposite meanings: to a geographer, a
“large” scale actually focuses on a small area. Here we intend the sense commonly
used by ecologists, according to which a large scale regards a large area.
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the 1970s and 1980s, when a strong drive for experimentation as the
dominant modality had the unintended consequence of research focused
only on small spatial and temporal scales, since those were amenable to
experimental manipulation. Most experiments in ecology are conducted
at the scale of a few square meters at most (Maurer 1999). This focus on
a single, relatively small scale remained largely unanalyzed, but if pressed,
researchers would justify it by analogy with physics. In physics, experi-
ments on small systems can be informative across many orders of mag-
nitude of scale (though this too can fail; Rueger and McGivern 2010).
For example, Galileo’s experiments with balls rolling down ramps at a
scale of a few meters and Brahe’s data on planetary orbits at scales of
1012 meters both informed and are well described by Newton’s three laws
of gravity, though they span 11 orders of magnitude of scale.
In the 1990s ecologists began to address larger scales again, largely in
response to questions about conservation that concern large scales. Ini-
tially, the unspoken assumption was that this would conform to the ex-
pectation that experiments done at that small scale would provide an
understanding of large-scale phenomena. But there was a growing reali-
zation that the processes important at larger scales are often fundamen-
tally different from those observed at lower scales (Wiens 1989; Levin
1992; Schwartz 2002). This set the stage for ecology to become explicitly
scale dependent. Individual studies began to specify the scales at which
the claims were expected to hold (McGill 2010). As a recent example,
McGill suggests that whether or not bird species live in an area is con-
trolled by random chance of dispersing to that area at scales of a few
meters, by species interactions at a slightly larger scale, by habitat pref-
erences (e.g., tall trees vs. grass) at scales of tens to hundreds of kilometers,
and finally by matches between climate and the species’ physiological
adaptations at scales approaching those of a continent. Wiens shows that
just as causal processes can differ with scale, so can the patterns that are
observed. He demonstrates how the abundance of two species of birds
covaries negatively at small scales (10 meters), because of competition for
nesting sites, but covaries positively at larger scales (10 kilometers), be-
cause of their similar habitat preference for coniferous forests. A change
of just three orders of magnitude in scale results in (a) a change in the
dominant causal influence—nest site competition versus habitat prefer-
ence—but more importantly in (b) a change in the very patterns ob-
served—positive versus negative covariance. Clearly ecology was not like
physics, and scale is completely central to defining the research question.
Scale is sometimes conflated with levels, and it would be convenient
if the two were interchangeable. For example, the influential work by
ecologists O’Neill et al. (1986) is sensitive to the importance of scale, yet
they attempt to assimilate scale to the model of discrete levels of orga-
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nization by claiming that the levels are defined by distinct timescales. This
approach is shared by the recent suggestion by Rueger and McGivern
(2010) about the role of scale in physics. They say that “when physicists
talk about levels, they often do not have in mind a mereological ordering
of entities. Instead, what they describe is best understood as a stratification
of reality into processes or behaviours at different scales” (382). Rueger
and McGivern suggest that scale can be used as the basis for an alternative
hierarchy, distinct from the compositional hierarchy. These sources add
support for the significance of scale and for its generalizability to other
fields. We wish to emphasize only that, unlike these authors, we think it
is important to fully distinguish between this alternative schema of scale
and the idea of a universal hierarchy of discrete levels.
3.2. Reconstructing Quasi Levels. The simple recognition of differ-
ences in scale is a well-positioned alternative to the problematic assump-
tion that there is a universal hierarchy of discrete levels. That different
treatments succeed at different scales offers a way to demarcate what one
might term “quasi levels.” In some respects, quasi levels are similar to
classic levels: cells occur on a scale of microns to millimeters, while tissues
are typically millimeters to decimeters; organisms (vertebrate and angio-
sperm, at least) are centimeters to many meters; ecosystems are measured
in kilometers; and the biosphere is much larger still. Yet the concept of
scale and the demarcation of quasi levels that it allows differ from the
classical concept in fundamental ways. Most basically, scale is continuous,
whereas levels are discrete. This has important implications for how en-
tities are related to one another. While scale gives a directionality (smaller/
bigger) just as levels do (lower/higher), the concept of scale focuses at-
tention on the distance between entities. The question of whether or not
that distance is of importance must be treated as an empirical and interest-
relative question.
For example, a squirrel may stand 0.1 meter high while a tree that it
lives in stands 10 meters high. Considered in terms of the traditional
compositional hierarchy, the squirrel and tree are at the same level: the
level of individual organisms. Yet their difference in scale is significant
for some investigations. Masting occurs when trees produces all their seeds
in large bursts, which happens only in some years. For investigations of
the evolution of masting, the salient relationship is between a population
of squirrels and an individual tree. One squirrel does not eat enough seeds
to drive trees to evolve masting; it takes an entire population. Indeed, the
time between masts has evolved to time periods roughly equal to the
generation time of a squirrel (about 2 years) so as to have maximal in-
fluence on the population dynamics of the squirrel while minimizing in-
fluence on the tree’s fitness. In contrast, for investigations of populations’
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northward progression in response to global climate change, the differ-
ences in size between a squirrel and a tree are insignificant. Their dispersal
distances are very similar; indeed there is evidence that the dispersal rate
of oak populations is heavily dependent on the dispersal of seeds by
squirrels (Corre et al. 1997; Clark 1998).
A few features of this example are illustrative. First, one level from
the traditional hierarchy (e.g., individual squirrel and tree) can span sev-
eral orders of magnitude of scale (here 0.1 vs. 10 meters), just as entities
of different compositional levels (e.g., squirrel population and tree) can
be of the same scale. Second, the difference in scale between the squirrel
and the tree is important in one scenario (masting evolution) but not in
the other (dispersal). Whether differences in scale are significant depends
on both the research question and the system under investigation. Quasi
levels are context dependent: they are explicitly defined relative to a par-
ticular domain and set of interests. Differences in scale are not domain
and interest relative; the relativity arises in where to locate boundaries in
scale. The determination of what range of scales to group together depends
on how the causal relationships under investigation behave: what entities
or groups of entities interact, at what scale different causal processes
become dominant, and so forth. There is therefore no expectation that a
successful demarcation of quasi levels has ontological significance or even
significance for unrelated phenomena. This is an important departure from
classic conceptions of hierarchical levels.
Another key difference between classic levels and quasi levels deter-
mined by scale is that the former elevates part-whole relationships to
prominence, while scale is fully independent of part-whole relationships.
The focus on composition is replaced by a focus on causal processes or
interactions. Put in terms of the previous example, one squirrel cannot
digest enough acorns to influence a large oak; in this case, significant
causal interaction requires a population of squirrels. Indeed, types of
causal interaction sometimes can be correlated with scale. Organisms tend
to compete with organisms that are similar in size, to eat organisms ap-
proximately an order of magnitude smaller, and to be infected by organ-
isms about two or three orders of magnitude smaller (Peters 1983).7
This demonstrates that the analysis of causal relationships is central
to demarcating quasi levels. Yet the significance of causality is markedly
7. Our suggestion that types of causal interaction are sometimes correlated with scale
is evocative of what Wimsatt (2007) terms “causal thickets” and the partial perspectives
they engender. In Wimsatt’s view, causal thickets are the alternative to well-defined
levels, for though he takes levels of organization to be an “extremely important feature
of the ontological architecture of our natural world” (203), he does not posit the
universality of levels (see n. 3 above).
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF CLASSIC LEVELS AND QUASI LEVELS
DEMARCATED FROM SCALE
Classic Levels Quasi Levels
Measure Discrete Continuous
Boundaries Universal Domain relative
Based on Composition Causal processes
Causal significance Causation only within a level Causation among all scales
Temporal scale Slower change at higher levels Independent of spatial scale
different from the causal significance attributed to classic levels of or-
ganization. First, we recommend using analysis of causal relationships to
demarcate quasi levels, whereas with classical levels, the direction is re-
versed: causation is supposed to occur within a level, so where to expect
causal relationships depends on the structure of the universal hierarchy.
Second, one may find causal interactions among entities or groups at any
range of scales, though there may of course be patterns in types of in-
teractions at different scales. Notice especially that small-scale phenomena
can be influenced by, and thus illuminated by, large-scale events. For the
example above, whether oaks can evolve a local adaptive response to
squirrels eating their acorns depends in part on gene flow from oaks in
many other regions, for this may swamp local selective pressures. In con-
trast, the classic hierarchy has been used to motivate the idea that causal
interactions occur only at a single level and are mediated by the next
lower level. Downward causation especially has been the target of much
criticism. Third, the concept of scale can structure investigations according
to both spatial scale and temporal scale, but correlation between these
two scales cannot be assumed. This is in contrast to the expectation that
classic compositional levels are related to rate of change. These differences
between classic levels and quasi levels are depicted in table 1.
We hope to have demonstrated that the concept of scale, along with
the derivative concept of quasi levels, offers a superior conceptual frame-
work over traditional hierarchical levels for conducting science, and es-
pecially ecology. We have not established that quasi levels in scale are the
only possible conceptual replacement for traditional levels, but we have
suggested ways in which these concepts do work similar to that of classical
levels while avoiding the latter’s pitfalls. Quasi levels, demarcated ac-
cording to the central concept of scale, provide a conception of organi-
zation that is overtly interest relative and problem dependent. Part-whole
composition may be universal, but it does not proceed in lockstep, and
it is not the sole structuring relationship among phenomena—or the most
significant. Replacing classical levels of organization with considerations
of scale brings the analysis of causality to the fore and allows causal
significance to govern the delineation of levels.
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